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Two laboratory experiments —onea statistical urn problem, the other a monetary policy
experiment —wererun to test the commonly-believed hypothesis that groups make decisions more
slowly than individuals do. Surprisingly, this turns out not to be true —thereis no significant difference
in average decision lags. Furthermore, and also surprisingly, there is no significant difference in the
decision lag when groups decisions are made by majority rule versus when they are made under a
unanimity requirement. In addition, group decisions are on average superior to individual decisions.
The results are strikingly similar across the two experiments.
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blinder@princeton.edu1. Introduction and Motivation
Do decisions made by groups differ systematically from the decisions of the
individuals who comprise them? That is a question infrequently asked by
economists, even though economics is often characterized as the science of
choice. As a profession, we analyze and glori1r the virtues of freely-made, self-
interested decisions. But those decisions are almost always individual choices: A
consumer with a utility function and a budget constraint decides what to
purchase; a firm, modeled as an individual decisionmaker, decides what will
maximize its profits; a central banker with a well-defined loss function selects the
optimal interest rate. While some economic literature, much of it derived from
Arrow's (1963) seminal work, deals with group decisionmaking, it seems fair to
say that economics dotes on individual choices: Some agent maximizes or
minimizes something by himself.
Many real-world choices are, in fact, like that--even though the welfare of
others may be taken into account. A consumer decides whether to buy milk or
wine, mindful of the wants and needs of the family. A sole proprietor decides how
many workers to hire, even if her objectives extend beyond her own profits. A
central bank governor makes monetary policy decisions on his own, even though
he has the best interests of society in mind. Decisions like these are the bread
and butter of economic analysis.
But many decisions in real societies--including some quite important ones-
-are made by groups. Legislators, of course, make the laws. The Supreme Court
2is a committee, as are all juries. Some business decisions, e.g., in partnerships or
management committees, are made collectively, rather than dictatorially. And
monetary policy decisions in many countries are made by committee rather than
by a single individual. The latter is, in fact, the application that motivated this
research. While one of us served as Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board,
he caine to believe that economic models might be missing something important
by treating monetary policy decisions as if they were made by a single individual
maximizing a well-defined loss function. As Blinder (1998, p. 20) subsequently
wrote:
While serving on the FOMC, I was vividly reminded of a few things all
of us probably know about committees: that they laboriously
aggregate individual preferences; that they need to be led; that they
tend to adopt compromise positions on difficult questions; and--
perhaps because of all of the above--that they tend to be inertial.
This sentiment reflects what is probably a widely-held view: that groups make
decisions more slowly than individuals. One major question for this paper is: Is it
true?
Why are so many important decisions entrusted to groups? Presumably
because of some belief in collective wisdom. In a complicated world, where no one
knows the "true" model or even all the facts, where data may be hard to process
or interpret, and where value judgments may influence decisions, it may be
beneficial to bring more than one mind to bear on a question. While it has been
said that nothing good was ever written by a committee,' could it be that
committees sometimes make better decisions than individuals?
'TheBible is often offered as an exception.
3So these are the two central questions for this paper: Do groups reach
decisions more slowly than individuals do? (We have never heard it suggested
that groups decide faster.) And are group decisions, on average, better or worse
than individual decisions?
Our approach is experimental. We created two laboratory experiments in
which literally everything was held equal except the nature of the decisionmaking
body--an individual or a group. Even the identities of the individuals were the
same, since each experimental group consisted of five people who also
participated as individuals. We therefore had automatic, experimental controls
for what are normally called ??individual effects.?? The laboratory setting also
allowed us to define an objective function--known to the experimental subjects--
that distinguished better decisions from worse ones with a clarity that is
normally unattainable in the real world. That is a huge advantage of the
laboratory approach. The artificiality is, of course, its principal drawback.
The experiments themselves, which will be described in detail below, were
very different.2 The first setup, which is described in detail in Section 2 below,
posed a purely statistical problem devoid of any economic content: Subjects were
asked to guess the composition of an (electronic) urn ??filled?? with blue balls and
red balls. The second, discussed in Section 3, mimicked the problem faced by
central bankers: Subjects were asked to steer an (electronic model of an)
2Thedata and program code for both experiments are available on request.
4economy by manipulating the interest rate. Participants in this experiment were
required to have some elementary knowledge of macroeconomics.3
The results were both striking and strikingly consistent. Neither
experiment supported the commonly-held belief that groups reach decisions
more slowly than individuals. That certainly came as a big surprise to us; our
priors were like seemingly everyone else's. And both experiments found that
groups, on average, made better decisions than individuals. (Here our priors were
much more diffuse.) Most stunningly, groups outperformed individuals by almost
exactly the same margin in each experiment. In addition, the experiments
unearthed another surprising finding: There were practically no differences
between group decisions made by majority rule and group decisions made under
a unanimity requirement. This, too, conflicted with our priors.
The remainder of the paper is organized into four sections. Section 2
describes the urn experiment and what we found. Section 3 does the same for
the monetary policy experiment. Section 4 reports briefly on some mainly-
unsuccessful attempts to model the group decisionmaking process, and Section
5 draws some tentative conclusions.
2. The Purely Statistical Experiment
2.1 Description of the Urn Experiment
Our first experiment placed subjects in a probabilistic environment devoid
of any economic content, but structured to capture salient features of monetary
Most of our subjects were Princeton University undergraduates. The requirement
5policy decisions where possible. While such content-free problem solving may be
of limited practical relevance, our motive was to create an experimental setting
into which students would carry little or no prior intellectual baggage. While
artificial in the extreme, this austere setup has an important virtue: It allows us
to isolate the pure effect of individual versus group decisionmaking.
Specifically, the problem--which was identical for individuals and groups--was
a variant of the classic ??urn problem?? in which subjects sample from an urn and
then are asked to estimate its composition. In our application, groups of five
students were placed in front of computers which were programmed with
electronic ??urns?? consisting, initially, of 50% ??blue balls?? and 50% ??red balls.??
They were told that the composition of the urn would, at some randomly-
selected point in the experiment, change to either 70% blue balls and 30% red
balls, or to 70% red and 30% blue. Subjects were not told when the change
would take place, nor in which direction--in fact, the latter is what they were
asked to guess. But we did inform them of the probability law that governed the
timing of the color change: The change was equally likely to occur just prior to
any of the first 10 draws and would definitely occur no later than the 10th.4
We provided subjects with a clear objective function so that we could
unambiguously distinguish better decisions from worse ones. This objective
function weighted the two criteria on which the quality of decisionmaking would
be judged--speed and accuracy--as follows. Subjects began each round with 40
wasthat they had taken Economics 101 or the equivalent.
'Randomnumber generators determined both the direction of the change and its
timing. Sampling was with replacement.
6points "in the bank" andcouldearn another 60 points by correctly guessing the
direction in which the urn's composition changed.5 Subjects were allowed to
draw as many "balls" as they wished before making their guess--up to an upper
limit of 40, which was rarely reached.6 However, they paid a penalty of one point
for each draw they made after the urn changed composition, but before they
guessed the majority color. (Call this the decision lag, L.) For example, if the
composition changed on the 8th draw, and the subject guessed correctly after the
15th draw, L=7 and the score for that round would be 40+60-7=93. If the guess
was incorrect, the score would be 40-7=33. A similar penalty was assessed if the
subject guessed the composition before the change took place (a negative
decision lag). Thus, if the composition was programmed to change on the 8th
draw, but the guess came after the 4th, the subject would be penalized 4 points




C =adummy variable =1if guess is correct
=0if guess is incorrect
L =decisionlag =T—N
T =thedraw on which the composition changed (a random integer drawn
from a uniform distribution on [1,10])
N =thedraw after which the subject guessed the composition of the urn.
Points were later converted into money at a rate known to the students: 500
points=$1.
6Inalmost 4200 plays of the game, this upper limit was hit only five times.
7Before going further, a few remarks on the structure of the experiment are
in order.
First, while the entire setup was devoid of substantive content, it was
designed to evoke the nature of monetary policy decisionmaking. For example,
policymakers never know for sure when macroeconomic conditions (analogous to
the urn's composition) call for a change in monetary policy (a declaration that the
composition has changed). Instead, they gradually receive more and more
information (more drawings from the urn) suggesting that a change in policy may
make sense. Eventually, enough such data accumulate, and policy is changed.
Nor does anyone tell the central bank whether policy should be tightened or
eased. (Is the urn now 70% red or 70% blue?) In principle, after the arrival of
each new piece of data (after each drawing), policymakers ask themselves
whether to adjust policy now or wait for more information--which is precisely
what our student subjects had to do.
Second, changes from 50%-50% to 70%-30% color ratios are pretty easy to
detect, but not "too easy."7 Again, this aspect of the experimental design was
meant to evoke the problem faced by monetary policymakers. Rarely are central
bankers in a quandary over whether they should tighten or ease. The policy
debate is usually over whether to tighten or do nothing, or over whether to ease
or do nothing.
This is a probabilistic statement. It is certainlypossible to draw, say,
equalnumbers of blue and red balls when the urn is, say, 70% red. Indeed, we
saw this happen during the experiment.
8Third, the ratio 60:1 in the objective function determines the relative
values of being accurate (60 points for getting the composition right) versus being
fast (each additional draw costs 1 point). This ratio was set so high for two
reasons. One is that it seems to us that accuracy--that is, getting the direction
right--is vastly more important than speed in the monetary policy context. The
other reason was that experimentation with this parameter taught us that quite a
high ratio was needed to dissuade subjects from jumping the gun by guessing
the color too soon. Students seemed extremely eager to decide, even on the basis
of scant information. Despite the 60:1 ratio, we still believe that, on average, they
made decisions too quickly.8
Fourth, 40 "free points" were provided on each round in order to make
negative scores impossible. The lowest possible score on any round--i point--
would be obtained by guessing incorrectly after 40 drawings when the change in
composition occurred on the 1st draw.
The game was played as follows. Each session had five subjects, mostly
Princeton undergraduates. Subjects were read detailed instructions (which they
also had in front of them in writing) and then allowed to practice with the
computer apparatus for about five minutes--during which time they could ask
any questions they wished. Scores during those practice rounds were displayed
for feedback, but not recorded. At the end of the practice period, all the machines
BHowever,the combinatorics of this problem are socomplicated that we cannot
provethat our hunch is correct--because we cannot solve analytically for the
optimal strategy. We can, however, place a theoretical upper bound of 89.25 on
the average score attainable using the optimal strategy. This upper bound is
derived from employing the optimal strategy in the urn experiment when there is
no uncertainty about the period that the urn changes composition.
9were reinitialized, and each student was instructed to play 10 rounds of the game
alone--without communicating in any way with the other students. Subjects were
allowed to proceed at their own pace; clock time was irrelevant. When all five
subjects had completed 10 rounds, the experimenter called a halt to Part One of
the experiment.9
In Part Two, the five students gathered around a single computer to play
the same game 30 times as a group. The rules were exactly the same, except that
students were now permitted to communicate freely with one another--as much
as they pleased. During group play, all five students received the group's
common scores. There were 20 sessions in all, involving 100 subjects. In half of
the sessions, decisions in Part Two were made by majority rule: The experimenter
told the group that he would do nothing until he had instructions from at least
three of the five students. In the other half of the experiments, decisions were
made unanimously: The experimenter told the subjects that he would do nothing
unless all five agreed.
After 30 rounds of group play, the subjects returned to their individual
machines for Part Three, in which they played the game another 10 times alone.
Following that, they returned to the group computer for Part Four, in which
decisions were now made unanimously if they had been by majority rule in Part
Two, or by majority rule if they had previously been under unanimity. Finally,
Theexperimenters were Blinder and Morgan for the first few sessions, and then
a graduate student, Felix Vardy, for the rest. In the urn experiment, we found
that while qualitative results were unaffected by the identity of the
experimenter, there was a significant level effect in scores: subjects on
average did worse in the first two sessions than in subsequent sessions -both
10Part Five concluded the experiment with 10 additional individual plays. Table 1
summarizes the flow of each session.
Table 1
The Flow of the Urn Experiment
Instructions
Practice Rounds (no scores recorded)
Part One:10 rounds played as individuals
Part Two: 30 rounds played as a group under majority rule
(alternatively, under unanimity)
Part Three: 10 rounds played as individuals
Part Four: 30 rounds played as a group under unanimity
(alternatively, under majority rule)
Part Five:10 rounds played as individuals
Students are paid in cash, fill out a short questionnaire, and leave.
Thus each session consisted of 90 rounds--30 played individually and 60
played as a group. Since we ran 20 sessions in all, we have data on 1200 group
rounds (20 x 60) and 3000 individual rounds (20 x 30 x 5).'° Sessions normally
lasted a bit under an hour, and subjects typically earned around $1 5--compared
to a theoretical maximum of $18 for a perfect score.
ingroups and as individuals. There were no experimenter effects in the
monetary policy experiment.
'°Thisis not quite true. Due to a computer glitch that we have been unable to
figure out, we lost a total of 37 observations--all from individual play in
Part Five.
112.2 The Three Main Hypotheses
While several subsidiary questions will be considered below, our interest
focused on the three main hypotheses mentioned in the introduction, especially
the first two:
Hi: Groups make decisions more slowly than individuals.
As noted earlier, the decision lag, L, can be positive (as was true 92.3% of
the time) or negative. The main idea that motivated this study was the widely-
believed notion that groups take longer to make decisions than individuals do.
Note that we measure the decision lag in number of draws--that is, the amount
of information required before a decision is reached--not in elapsed clock time,
which we deemed to be irrelevant and did not measure.
Specifically, let Li be the average lag for the i-th individual in the group
(i= 1,..., 5) when he or she plays the game alone, and let LG be the average lag for
those same five people when making decisions as a group. Under the null
hypothesis of no group interaction, which we expected to reject, the group's mean
lag would equal the average of the five individual mean lags:
L. =(Li+L2+L3+L4+L5)/5.
Furthermore, under this null, a simple t-test for difference in means is the
appropriate test."
Surprisingly, the hypothesis of equality could not be rejected. The overall
mean lag was indeed slightly longer for groups than for individuals (6.60 draws
"Wethank Alan Krueger for reminding us ofthis simple consequence of the
Neymann-Pearsonlemma.
12versus 6.40), but that small difference is not significant at conventional levels
(t= 1.1), even with thousands of observations. Histograms for the variable L for
individuals and groups look strikingly alike. (See Figure 1.)
Figure1: Histograms of Lag in Urn Experiment
Theindividual distribution gives the impression of a mean preserving
spread on the group distribution. If we eliminate the first ten rounds of each
treatment (individual, majority rule, and unanimity) as a crude adjustment for
learning,'2 the result is even more surprising: Group decisions were actually
made slightly faster than individual decisions (6.89 draws versus 6.99), although
the difference is far from significant (t-statistic =0.5).
Looking at the test statistic z =LG-(L,+L2+L3+L4+L5)/5for each of the
sessions separately, we find that we can reject the null hypothesis of equality
12Wewill have much more to say about learning later, including some evidence
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lag(z=0) at the 5% level seven times out of 20. That sounds like a lot of evidence
against the null. But the group made decisions faster than the individuals
comprising the group in three of these cases and slower in four. So there is really
no systematic difference in speed.
The overall conclusion, then, is a surprising one: Something that 'everyone
knows"--that group decisionmaking takes longer--is not supported by these
experimental data.'3
112: Groups make better decisions than individuals.
A quite different hypothesis concerns the quality of decisionmaking, rather
than the speed. Do groups make better decisions than individuals? This idea
may not come naturally to economists, since our discipline glorifies individual
decisionmaking. Furthermore, in this particular experimental setup, every
subject has the same objective function and receives the same information. So,
were they all to behave like homo economicus, they would make identical
decisions.
In reality, different people placed in identical situations do not always
reach the same decisions. Furthermore, as we observed in Section 1, many
important economic and social decisions in the real world are assigned to groups
rather than to individuals. Presumably, there is a reason.
In any case, the hypothesis that groups outperform individuals is strongly
supported by the experimental data. Remember, we designed the experiment to
'Asnoted earlier, we define "taking longer" in this context as requiring more
drawings before reaching a decision, not as taking more clock time. While we
14yield an unambiguous measure of the quality of the decision: S ("score"), as
defined in equation (1). In the overall sample, the average score attained by
groups was 86.8 (on a 1-100 scale), versus only 83.7 for individuals. The
difference is highly significant statistically (t =4.3).More important, it seems to
be economically meaningful: Groups did 3.7% better, on average.'4 Interestingly,
this gap narrows to 2.3%, but remains significant (t=2.4), when we drop the first
10 observations of each treatment to allow for learning.
Obviously, since the mean lags are statistically indistinguishable, the
groups must have acquired their overall edge through accuracy rather than
through speed. Specifically, the groups guessed the urn's composition correctly
89.3% of the time whereas the individuals got the color right only 84.3% of the
time. Considering that the experimental apparatus was set up to make guessing
the correct composition relatively easy, this gap of 5 percentage points is sizable.
Look at it this way: The error rate (frequency of guessing the wrong color) was
15.7% for individuals, but only 10.7% for groups. The difference in performance
is also highly significant statistically (t=4.2). However, the gap drops to only 2.9
percentage points (with t=2.2) when the first 10 observations of each treatment
are excluded.
In brief we find that group decisions are more accurate without being
slower. Maybe two heads (or, in this case, five) really are better than one.
didnot keep systematic data on this, we are quite certain that group decisions
took longer on the clock.
''Thatdifference is about 72% of the standard deviation across individual mean
scores.
15H3: Decisions by majority rule are made/aster than under a
unanimity requirement.
Before we ran the experiment, it seemed obvious that requiring unanimous
agreement would slow down the group decisionmaking process, relative to using
majority rule. But observing the subjects interacting face-to-face in real time
showed something quite different. If you observed the game without having heard
the instructions, it was hard to tell whether the game was being played under the
unanimity principle or under majority rule. Perhaps it was peer group pressure,
or perhaps it was simply a desire to be cooperative.'5 But, for whatever reason,
majority decisions quickly evolved into unanimous decisions. In almost all cases,
once three or four subjects agreed on a course of action, the remaining one or
two fell in line immediately.'6
In fact, and quite surprisingly, decisions under the unanimity requirement
were actually made faster, on average, than decisions under majority rule (mean
L=6.34 versus 6.85). The difference is significant at the 5% level in a one-tail
test. However, there was no significant difference between the two group
treatments in either decisionmaking accuracy (C) or quality (S). The composition
of the urn was guessed correctly 89.2% of the time under majority rule and
89.5% of the time under unanimity.
Thus, in most of what follows, we will pool data from the majority-rule and
unanimity treatments. The data support such pooling.
'Studentstypically did not know one another prior to the experiment, though
in some cases, purely by chance, they did.
162.3 Other Results
Learning
Having mentioned the issue of learning several times, we now turn to it
explicitly. The game is rather cumbersome to describe in words, but is extremely
easy to play "once you get the hang of it." So we suspected that there would be
learning effects, at least in the early rounds: Students would get better at the
game as they played it more (up to a point). This is why we began each
experimental session with a "practice period" in which subjects could familiarize
themselves with the apparatus. But it was clear to us that many students were
still not fully comfortable with the game when play started "for real."
While we performed a variety of simple statistical tests for learning, Figure
2 probably displays the results better than any regressions or t-tests. To
construct this graph, we partitioned the data by round, reflecting the
chronological order of play. There are 90 rounds in each session--30 played as
individuals, and 60 played as groups (see Table 1). So, for example, we have 100
observations (20 sessions times five individuals in each) on each of the first 10
rounds, 20 observations on each of rounds 11-40 (the 20 groups), and so on.
Figure 2 displays the mean score by round; vertical lines indicate the points
where subjects switched from individual to group decisionmaking, or vice-versa.
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Figure 2: Mean Score by Round in Urn Experiment
Ifthere are systematic learning effects, scores should improve as we
progress through the rounds. The figure shows clear evidence of learning over the
first 10-12 rounds, but none thereafter. In addition, it is evident that average
performance jumps upward when we switch from individual to group play (the
vertical lines at 10 and 50), and jumps downward when we switch from group to
individual play (the vertical lines at 40 and 80). All four of these changes are
statistically significant. In sum, the figure (and related statistical tests) suggest
that learning occurred, but was limited to the early rounds, and was dwarfed by
the difference in quality between individual and group decisions.
It is natural to wonder whether learning mostly affects speed (the
decisionmaking lag, L) or accuracy (whether the urn's composition is guessed
correctly, C). The answer is both, though in different ways--as Figures 3 and 4
18show. Interestingly, Figure 3, which displays the mean decision lag, suggests the
presence of learning throughout the experiment; there is a clear trend toward
waiting longer before guessing the dominant color.'7 But Figure 4, which shows
the percentage of correct guesses, looks a lot like Figure 2--learning ends after
the first 10-12 rounds. The reason is clear from equation (1): In computing the
score, C (correct) gets 60 times the weight of L (lag). Had we weighted L more












Figure 3: Mean Lag by Round in Urn Experiment
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' Remember,we strongly believe that subjects tended to "jump the gun." So
longer average lags are presumptively better. Indeed, several students observed
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Figure 4: Mean Percent Correct in Urn Experiment
ExperimentalOrder
In anyexperimentaldesign, there is always a danger that results may be
affected by the ordering of parts of the experiment. That is precisely why we
arranged the parts of the experiment as we did: to have group play both precede
and follow individual play, and to have unanimity both precede and follow
majority rule. Nonetheless, the question remains: Does ordering matter?
Unfortunately, there is a little evidence that it does. Consider the scores
obtained in the second 30 rounds of group play (600 observations from rounds
51-80). If the groups played first under the unanimity rule and then under
majority rule (300 observations, the mean score was 88.7. If the order was
20
40 50reversed, the mean score fell to 85.2. The difference is significant by conventional
standards (t=2.4, p =0.018), and we have no explanation for it.18
Fortunately, this puzzling finding was not replicated in the individual data,
so we are inclined to treat it as a fluke. Rounds 41-50 and 81-90 of individual
play took place after the subjects? first experience with group play. If their initial
group experience was under unanimity, the individual scores in subsequent
rounds averaged 84.2; but if that initial group experience was under majority
rule, subsequent individual scores averaged 85.8. That difference, while not quite
significant (t= 1.8, p= .074), goes in the opposite direction from what we found in
group play. So, on balance, experimental order does not appear to have much of
an effect on the results.
D(/ferences between men and women
Our student volunteers were 51.6% female and 48.4% male--which is a few
percentage points more female than the Princeton student body. The sex
composition of each group was a matter of chance: Students signed up for the
time periods they preferred, and we made no effort to control the composition of
any group. The resulting distribution of the 20 groups by sex turned out to
correspond roughly to what would be expected from random selection: For
example, ten groups had a male majority and 10 had a female majority.
Did men and women play the game differently? When playing as
individuals, females on average made decisions slightly faster than males (mean
BRememberthat, on average, there was no significant difference in scores
between unanimity and majority rule.
21lag =6.22draws versus 6.58 for males; t= 1.8), but noticeably less accurately
(percentage correct =82.7versus 86.0 for males; t=2.5). On balance, men's'
scores were better by 2. 1%--a difference that is significant at conventional levels
(t=2.2). While we did not formulate any priors on differences by sex, we probably
would have guessed that men were more inclined to "shoot from the hip" than
women. But the data indicate otherwise.
We can also compare the performances of groups with a majority of men
versus groups with a majority of women. Here no statistically significant
differences emerged in overall score, lag length, or percent correct. Thus males do
better alone, but male-dominated groups do not outperform female-dominated
groups. A suggestive inference, which is tantalizing but highly tentative, is that
women gain more from group interactions than do men.
3. The Monetary Policy Experiment
As noted in the introduction, we designed our urn experiment to capture
many of the features of monetary-policy decisionmaking--except that it made no
reference whatsoever to monetary policy (nor to any other real-world context).
Our second experiment put the context back into the problem by asking subjects
to assume the role of monetary policymaker explicitly. For this reason we added a
prerequisite in recruiting subjects: They had to have taken at least one course in
macroeconomics. Otherwise, we tried to make the mechanics of the monetary-
policy experiment resemble the urn experiment as closely as possible.
3.1 Description of the Monetary Policy Experiment
22Just as before, we brought students into the laboratory in groups of five,
and we ran twenty sessions. But since each round of play took much longer, the
groups only played the monetary policy game 20 times as individuals (versus 30
in the urn experiment), 10 times under majority rule, and 10 times under
unanimity (versus 30 each in the urn experiment). Despite the much smaller
number of plays, sessions in the monetary policy experiment typically lasted
considerably longer: about 90 minutes.
The setup was as follows. We programmed each computer with a simple
two-equation macroeconomic model that approximates a canonical model
popular in the recent theoretical literature on monetary policy,'9 choosing (not
estimating) parameter values that resembled the U.S. economy:
(2) Ut-5=0.6(Ut-,-5)+0.3(it-,-ict-,-5)-Gt+et
(3) Itt= 0.4itt-i+O.37Ct-2+O.27Ct3+0.lltt-4 -0.5(Ut-i-5)+wt.
Equation (2) can be thought of as a reduced form combining an IS
curve with Okuns Law. Specifically, U is the unemployment rate, and the
assumed ??natural rate?? is 5%. Since i is the nominal interest rate and itisthe
rate of inflation, the term t- itt - 5connotes the deviation of the real interest rate
from its equilibrium or ??neutral?? value, which is also set at 5%2OHigher(lower)
real interest rates will push unemployment up (down), but only gradually. Our
'See, for example, Ball (1997) and Rudebusch and Svensson (1999)
20 The neutral real interest rate is defined as the real rate at which inflation
is neither rising nor falling. See Blinder (1998, pages 31-33)
23experimental subjects, playing the role of the Federal Reserve, controlled only the
nominal interest rate, not the real interest rate.
The Gt term connotes the affect of fiscal actions on unemployment and is
the random event, analogous to the urn changing composition, that our
experimental monetary policymakers are supposed to recognize and react to. G
starts at zero and randomly changes to either +0.3 or -0.3 sometime within the
first 10 periods. When this happens, it changes unemployment by that amount,
but in the opposite direction (see equation (2)). Prior to the shock, the model's
steady-state equilibrium is (U=5, i-ic=5). Because the long-run Phillips curve is
vertical, any constant inflation rate can be a steady state. But we always began
the experiment with inflation at 2%--which is the inflation target. The shock
changes the "neutral" real interest rate to either 6% or 4%, as is apparent from
the coefficients in equation (2). Our subjects were supposed to react to this event,
presumably with a lag, by raising or lowering the nominal interest rate.
Equation (3) is a standard accelerationist Phillips curve. Inflation depends
on the lagged unemployment rate and on its own four lagged values, with weights
summing to one. The weighted average of past inflation rates can be thought of
as representing expected inflation, but the model does not demand this
interpretation. The coefficient on the unemployment rate was chosen to match
empirically estimated Phillips curves for the United States.
24Finally, the two stochastic shocks, et and Wt, were drawn from uniform
distributions on the interval [-.25, +.25].21Theirstandard deviations are
approximately 0.14, or about half the size of the G shock. This choice, like the
70-30 composition of the urn, controls the "signal to noise" ratio in the
experiment. (More on this below.)
Monetary policy affects inflation only indirectly in this model, and with a
distributed lag that begins two periods later. A change in t affects U starting in
period t+ 1 (see equation (2)), and that in turn affects it with a distributed lag that
begins in period t+2 (see equation (3)). All of our subjects understood that higher
interest rates reduce inflation and raise unemployment with a lag, and that lower
interest rates do just the reverse.22 But they did not know any details of the
model's specification, coefficients, or lag structure.
Stabilizing such a system can be rather tricky. Because equation (3) builds
in a unit root, the model will diverge from equilibrium when perturbed by a G
shock--unless it is stabilized by monetary policy. But the lags make the
divergence pretty gradual. One useful way to think about this dynamic instability
is as follows. Start the system at equilibrium with U=5, ic=2, and i=7, as we did.
Now suppose G rises to 0.3. By (2), the neutral real rate of interest increases to
6%; so the initial real rate (5%) is now lower than neutral--and hence
expansionary. With a lag, inflation begins to rise. If the central bank fails to raise
21Thedistributions were uniform, rather than normal, for programming
convenience.
22Remember,all of our subjects had at least some exposure to basic
macroeconomics. Lest they had forgotten, the instructions reminded them that
raising the rate of interest would lower inflation and raise unemployment,
while lowering the rate of interest would have the opposite effects.
25the nominal interest rate, the real rate falls further--stimulating the economy
even more.
Each play of the game proceeded as follows. We started the system in
steady state equilibrium with Gt=O, current and lagged nominal interest rates at
7% (reflecting a 5% real rate and a 2% inflation target), lagged U at 5%, and all
lags of it at 2%. The computer selected values for the two random shocks and
displayed the first-period values, Ui and lti, on the screen for the subjects to see.
(Normally, these were quite close to the optimal values of U=5% and ic=2%.) For
each subsequent period, new random values of et and wt were drawn, thereby
creating statistical noise, and the lagged variables that appear in equations (2)
and (3) were inherited from the past. The computer would calculate Ut and itt and
display them on the screen, along with all past values. Subjects were then asked
to choose an interest rate for the next period, and the game continued.
No time pressure was applied; subjects were permitted to take as much
clock time as they pleased to make decisions. At some period chosen at random
from a uniform distribution between t= 1 and t= 10, Gt was either raised to +0.3 or
lowered to -0.3. (Whether G rose or fell was also decided randomly.) Students
were not told when G changed, nor in which direction. But they were told the
probability laws that governed the changes. All this is just as it was in the urn
problem.
Even though our primary interest was in the decision lag--the number of
periods it took for subjects to react to the change in G, we did not stop the game
when the interest rate was first changed because this seemed unnatural in the
26monetary-policy context. Instead, each play of the game continued for 20 periods.
(Subjects were told to think of each period as a quarter.)
To evaluate the quality of the decisions, we needed a loss function. While
quadratic loss functions are the rule in the academic literature, they are rather
too difficult for subjects to calculate in their heads. So we used an absolute-value
function instead. Specifically, subjects were told that their score for each quarter
would be:
andthescore for the entire game (henceforth, 5)would be the (unweighted)
average of st over the 20 quarters. The coefficients in (4) scale the scores into
percentages--giving them a ready, intuitive interpretation. Equal weights on
unemployment deviations and inflation deviations were chosen to facilitate
mental calculations: Every miss of 0.1 cost one point. Thus, for example, missing
the unemployment target by 0.5 (in either direction) and the inflation target by
0.7 would result in a score of 100 -12=88for that period. At the end of the
entire session, scores were converted into money at the exchange rate of 25 cents
for each percentage point. Subjects typically earned about $2 1-$22 out of a
theoretical maximum of $25.
Finally, we "charged" subjects a fixed cost of 10 points each time they
changed the rate of interest, regardless of the size of the change.23 The reason is
as follows. The random shocks, et and wt, were an essential part of the
experimental design because, without them, the changes in Gt would have been
23Tokeep things simple, only integer interest rates were allowed.
27trivial to observe: No variable would ever change until G did. After some
experimentation, we decided that random shocks with standard deviations about
half the size of the G shock made it neither too easy nor too difficult to discern
the Gt "news" amidst the et and wt "noise"
But this decision created an inference problem: Our subjects might receive
several false signals before G actually changed. For example, a two-standard-
deviation e shock appears just like a negative G shock, except that the latter is
permanent while the former is transitory. (The random shocks were iid.)
Furthermore, subjects knew neither the size of the G shock nor the standard
deviations of e and w; so they had no way of knowing that a two-standard-
deviation disturbance would look (at first) like a G shock.
In some early trials designed to test the apparatus, we observed students
moving the interest rate up and down frequently--sometimes almost every period.
Such behavior would make it virtually impossible to measure (or even to define)
the decision lag in monetary policy. So we instituted a small, 10-point charge for
each interest rate change. Ten points is not much of a penalty--averaged over a
20-period game, it amounts to just 0.5%. But we found it was large enough to
deter most of the excessive fiddling with interest rates. It also had the collateral
benefit of making behavior a bit more realistic.24 The Fed does not jigger the
interest rate around every quarter, presumably because it perceives some cost in
doing so that is not captured in equation (4).
24Withoneexception: Since the game terminated after 20 periods, students
generally concluded that it was not worth paying 10 points to change the rate
of interest in one of the last few periods.
28The sequencing of the monetary policy game closely followed the
sequencing of the urn experiment, and is shown in Table 2:
Table 2
The Flow of the Monetary Policy Experiment
Instructions
Practice Rounds (no scores recorded)
Part One: 10 rounds played as individuals
Part Two: 10 rounds played as a group under majority rule
(alternatively, under unanimity)
Part Three: 10 rounds played as individuals
Part Four: 10 rounds played as a group under unanimity
(alternatively, under majority rule)
Students are paid in cash, fill out a short questionnaire, and leave.
The ground rules were the same as in the urn experiment: Students could
communicate freely, as much as they wished, during group play, but could not
communicate with one another during individual play.
Comparing Tables 1 and 2 reveals two differences. First, there is no ??Part
Five?? in which students finish by playing the game as individuals yet again.
Hence we obtained only 20 individual observations per subject, or 2,000 in all.
Second, we have many fewer group observations--just 20 per session, or 400 in
all. Both changes were dictated by time constraints. Because the monetary policy
game requires a great deal more thought than the urn problem, each round takes
longer. Furthermore, each play of the monetary policy game always lasted 20
29periods, whereas the urn problem often terminated after fewer than 10 draws. It
was unrealistic to ask subjects to commit more than two hours of their time,25
and 40 plays of the game were about all we could count on finishing within that
time frame.
3.2 The Three Main Hypotheses
We were gratified to find that the monetary policy experiment--which was
what originally motivated this research--produced exactly the same answers to
our three main questions as the urn experiment. Remember, the urn problem
was specifically designed to strip away any relevant background knowledge or
institutional baggage in order to focus squarely on the decisionmaking process
per se. But real-world decisions are not like that. Actual decisionmakers always
carry into the room a wealth of experience, knowledge, prejudices, etc. Certainly,
that is true of monetary policymakers. To find precisely the same results in these
two very different contexts gives us some confidence that we have discovered
something real.
Now to the specifics. Remember, our first and most crucial hypothesis was:
Hi: Groups make decisions more slowly than individuals.
The lags in the monetary policy game were actually quite short, averaging
just over 2.4 "quarters" over the 2400 observations. In fact, many subjects
"jumped the gun" by moving interest rates before G had changed. (This happened
in 15.2% of all cases.) However, the group decisions were made slightly faster,
25Although sessions normally took closer to 1 1/2hours, we insisted that
subjectsagree to commit two hours, since the premature departure of even one
subject would ruin an entire session.
30with a mean lag of just 2.30 periods (with standard deviation 2.75) versus 2.45
periods (with standard deviation 3.50) for the individual decisions. This scant
0.15 difference, even though it goes in a direction opposite the null hypothesis, is
not close to being statistically significant (t=0.78, p=.22 in a one-tailed test).
Figure 5 displays the histograms of the variable L (the decision lag) for
individual and group play. As in the urn problem, the former looks like a mean-
preserving spread on the latter. Hence, once again, we find no support
whatsoever for the seemingly-obvious hypothesis that groups decide more slowly
than individuals.
Figure5: Histograms of Lag in Monetary Experiment
112:Groups make better decisions than individuals.
Remember, we scored (and paid) our fauxmonetarypolicymakers
according to how well they kept unemployment near 5% and inflation near 2%






















2Oalmost 86% on average. (We designed the experiment this way.) But, also as in
the urn experiment, the groups did better than the individuals. The mean score
over the 400 group observations was 88.3% (with standard deviation 4.7%),
versus only 85.3% (standard deviation 10.1%) over the 2000 individual
observations. The difference is economically meaningful and highly significant
statistically (t=5.9). Perhaps most strikingly, the 3.5% performance gap between
groups and individuals almost exactly matches what we found in the purely
statistical urn experiment (a 3.7% gap). We were, frankly, stunned to find
essentially the same average performance improvement in two such different
experimental settings. Even if we had been determined to ??rig the deck?? to make
the two performance gaps come out the same, we would have had no idea how to
do so.
So, once again, we found that group decisions were superior to individual
decisions without being slower--which suggests that group decisions dominate
individual decisions.
We can also construct a variable analogous to the dummy variable C--for
whether the color was guessed correctly--in the urn experiment. Specifically,
when G rose, subjects were supposed to increase interest rates; and when G fell,
subjects were supposed to decrease interest rates. So define the variable C
(correct) for the monetary policy experiment as 1 if the first interest rate change
is in the same direction as G changes, and 0 if it is not.26 Unlike in the urn
experiment, the variable C does not enter the loss function directly. But we
32certainly expect subjects to attain higher scores when their first move is in the
right direction. In fact, the simple correlation between moving in the correct
direction initially and final score is 0.37.
Here, once again, groups outperformed individuals by a notable margin.
The average value of C was .843 for individuals but .905 for groups. This
difference is highly significant statistically (t=3.6, p=O.OO3). Economically, it is
even more noteworthy. When playing as individuals, our ersatz monetary
policymakers moved interest rates in the wrong direction 15.7% of the time.
When acting as a group, however, these same people got the direction wrong only
9.5% of the time. Finally, the margin of superiority of groups over individuals (6.2
percentage points) is again strikingly similar to what we found in the urn
experiment (5.0 percentage points).
H3: Decisions by majority rule are made/aster than under a
unanimity requirement.
As noted earlier, we were surprised to find almost no differences between
groups operating under majority rule and groups operating under the unanimity
principle in the urn experiment. In fact, contrary to our priors, decisions were
made slightly faster under the unanimity requirement. By the time we got to the
monetary policy experiment, we expected no differences--which is just what we
found.
26For this purpose, we look only at the first interest-rate change. In most
plays of the game, rates were changed several times.
33Observationally, it was hard to tell whether groups were using majority
voting or unanimous agreement to make decisions. Statistically, the mean lag
under unanimity was indeed slightly longer than under majority rule--2.4
periods versus 2.2 periods--in conformity with H3, but in contrast to what we
found in the urn problem. However, the difference did not come close to
statistical significance (t=0.9). When it came to average scores, the two decision
rules finished in what was essentially a dead heat (just as they had in the earlier
experiment): 88.0% under majority rule, and 88.6% under unanimity. Hence, we
are again comfortable with pooling the majority-rule and unanimity results.
3.3 Other findings
Learning
In the urn problem, we detected sizable learning effects in the early rounds
that were, however, swamped by the effect of changing from individual to group
play. So scores rose whenever we moved from individual to group play and fell
when we moved from groups back to individuals. That is essentially--but not
quite--what we found in the monetary policy experiment as well.
Partitioning the 2400 observations by round (which now runs from 1 to
40), Figure 6 suggests a trend toward longer decision lags for about the first 30
rounds. Looked at more carefully, however, the data show an upward trend
within the individual rounds (1-10 and 2 1-30) but no trend whatsoever within
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Figure 6: Mean Lag by Round in Monetary Experiment
Presumingthat longer lags imply that people have "learned" assumes that
decisions are typically made too quickly. We do hold this view. As we have said
several times, we believe that subjects tended "jumped the gun." But a more
relevant test is surely to inspect the average scores by round--as is done in
Figure 7. Here we see a rather different, and quite striking, pattern. There is no
indication whatsoever of any learning within the first 10 rounds of individual
play. However, the first experience with group play (in rounds 11-20) clearly
makes the individuals better monetary policymakers when they go back to
playing the game alone (in rounds 21-30). Within that second batch of 10 rounds
of individual play, there is again no evidence of learning. So our conclusion is
that there is little evidence of learning, but overwhelming evidence for the
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Figure 7: Mean Score by Round in Monetary Experiment
T-testsverify these graphical impressions. Looking first at individual play,
the increase in mean score from rounds 1-10 to rounds 21-30 is notable (3.2%)
and extremely significant (t=6. 1). The standard deviation also drops markedly. All
this suggests substantial learning. Learning effects were minor across the two
rounds of group play--the mean score in rounds 31-40 was just 0.9% higher
than the mean score in rounds 11-20. This improvement is not quite statistically
significant (t=1.6, p=.l2).
Experimental order
In the urn experiment, we were dismayed to find that the order of group
play seemed to matter. In particular, subjects performed significantly better in
subsequent group play if their initial exposure to group decisionmaking was
under unanimity, rather than under majority rule. For individuals, however, the
36performance gap went in just the opposite direction--but it was not significant.
So we were inclined to write these results off as a fluke.
Results from the monetary policy experiment suggest that was the right
decision. Neither the scores from group play in rounds 31-40 nor the scores from
individual play in rounds 2 1-30 appear to be affected by whether the subjects?
first participation in group decisionmaking (in rounds 11-20) was under majority
rule or a unanimity requirement.
D(/ferences between men and women
The monetary policy experiment imposed a screen for subject selection that
the urn experiment did not: Students had to have taken a course in
macroeconomics. Not surprisingly, that tilted the gender ratio a bit: to 54% male,
46% female. In consequence, we wound up with more groups with male
majorities (11 out of 20).
As in the urn experiment, we found some differences between the ways
men and women played the game--but here they were more minor. When playing
as individuals, female subjects generally reacted slightly more quickly to changes
in aggregate demand (mean lag =2.31periods versus 2.56 periods for males; t =
1.7).But the scores they earned were not significantly lower than those earned
by the men.
However, groups with a female majority had a longer average decision lag
(2.49 periods) than groups with a male majority (2.14 periods), rather than a
shorter one. The difference, however, was not significant (t= 1.3). Similarly, while
37male-dominated groups outscored female-dominated groups by a slight margin
0.7%), the difference was insignificant (t= 1.4).
4. Can We Model Group Decisionmaking?
It is possible to formulate and test several simple models of how groups
aggregate individual views into group decisions. None of these are strictly
'economic" models, however, because every homo economicus should make the
same decision. (After all, the objective function and the information are identical
for all participants.) As will be clear shortly, none of these simple, intuitive
models of group decisionmaking gets us very far.
Model 1: The whole is equal to the sum of its parts
The simplest model is that there are no group interactions at all: The
group's decision is simply the average of the five individual decisions. This, of
course, come closest to the pure economic model (which says that everyone
agrees). However, this model has, essentially, already been tested and rejected in
Sections 2 and 3. Let X denote any one of our three decision variables (L, 5, or
C), and let XG be the average value attained by the group and XA be the average
values attained by the five people in the group while they played as individuals.
As noted earlier, we consistently reject XG =XAin favor of the alternative that
groups do better.
Now let us ask a slightly different question: Looking across the 20 groups,
does the average performance of the five people who comprise a particular group
(XA) take us very far in explaining--in a regression sense--how well the group
38does on that same criterion (XG)?Sincewe have three different choices of X (L, 5,
and C) and data from two different experiments, we can pose six versions of this
question. Rather than display the (rather unsuccessful) regression equations,
Figure 8 shows the corresponding scatter diagrams. Each is based on 20
observations, one for each session. What message do these six charts convey?
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Figure8: Group Compared to Average Individual Play
40In general, they give the impression that a linear model of the form XG =a
+bXA+udoes not fit the data at all well.27 In one case, the correlation is even
negative--which is really quite astounding. Looking across the three variables, LA
does by far the best job of explaining LG, although even here the simple
correlations are just 0.58 in the urn experiment and 0.57 in the monetary policy
experiment--corresponding to R2s of about 0.33. (The regression coefficients are
0.84 and 0.90, respectively.) In the monetary policy experiment, the correlations
for the other two variables, S and C, are nearly zero.
In a word, the average performance of the five individuals who comprise
each group carries almost no explanatory power for how well the group
performed. The Yankees and the Lakers would be surprised--and would be
spending too much on payroll--if this were true in professional sports.
Model 2: The median voter theory
A different concept of "average" plays a time-honored role in one of the few
instances of group decisionmaking that economists have modeled extensively:
voting. Where preferences are single-peaked, as they must be in these
applications, a highly-pedigreed tradition in public finance holds that the views
of the median voter should prevail. It seems natural, then, to ask whether the
performance of the median player can explain the performances of our 5-person
groups? Remember, we literally used either a majority vote or a unanimous vote
to determine the group's decisions in our experiments.
27Itisapparent from the diagrams that linearity is not the issue. Noobvious
nonlinearmodel does much better.
41Figure 9, which follows the same format as Figure 8, shows that the
median voter model generally (but not always) is a better predictor of group
outcomes than simple averaging. In one case, the R2 gets as high as .54. But, in
general, these six scatters once again show that even the median-voter model has
only modest success (and, in some cases, no success at all) in explaining the
performance of the group. As before, the groups' L decisions are explained best;
the R2's of the two regressions are .054 for the urn data and .42 for the monetary
policy data. In two cases (variables S and C in the monetary policy experiment),
the correlation is actually negative.
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43Model 3: May the best man (or woman) win
In discussing our experiment with other economists, several suggested that
the group's decisions would be dominated by the best player in the group--as
indicated, presumably, by his or her scores while playing alone. This hypothesis
struck us as plausible, even after watching the games being played many times.
So we tested models of the form XG= a+bX*+u,where X* is the average
outcome (on variable 5, C, or L) of the individual who achieved the highest
average score while playing alone.
There is, however, a logically prior question: Are there statistically
significant individual fixed effects that can be used to identi1r "better" and
"worse" players? To answer this question, we ran a series of regressions, one for
each experimental session, explaining individual scores by five dummy variables,
one for each player.28 Perhaps surprisingly, this preliminary test of the idea that
there is a "best player" turned up absolutely no evidence of reliable individual
fixed effects in the urn experiment: Only four of the 100 individual dummy
variables were significant at the 5% level. In the monetary policy experiment,
however, there was some weak evidence that some players are better and others
worse: 15 of the 100 individual dummies were significant at the 5% level.
With this in mind, we can now look at Figure 10, which displays the six
scatter diagrams. In general, the fits appears to be quite modest. (The highest R2
among the six scatters is .28.) In only one of the six cases (explaining CGinthe
2BThuseach regression was based on 150 observations in the urn experiment and
100 observations in the monetary policy experiment.
44monetary policy experiment), is this the best-fitting model; in three cases, it is
the worse. Once again, the variable L is explained best.
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45Finally, we note that various multiple regressions using, say, both XA and
X* do not appreciably improve the fit. In the end, we are left to conclude that
neither the average player, nor the median player, nor the best player determine
the decisions of the group. The whole, we repeat, does indeed seem to be
something different from--and generally better than--the sum of its parts.
5. Conclusions
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the striking similarly in findings from
these two very different experiments is to rack them up, side by side, as we do in
Table 3:
Table 3
Urn experiment Monetary Policy
Experiment
1.Groups no slower Groups no slower
2.Groups better by 3.7% Groups better by 3.5%
3.Majority rule approx. the
same as unanimity




Early learning does not
improve scores
5.Women decide faster Women decide faster
6.Men outperform women
as individuals
Men do not outperform
women as individuals
7.Male majorities do not
outperform female
majorities







not higher if unanimity
comes first
9.Simple models of group
behavior fit poorly






While there are some minor differences (noted above) between the results of the
urn experiment and those of the monetary policy experiment, the correspondence
is little short of amazing.
From the start, our interest centered on the first two findings:
*Dogroups reach decisions more slowly than individuals? According to
these experimental results, what seemingly everyone believes (including the
authors, prior to this study) is simply not true: Groups appear to be no slower in
reaching decisions than individuals are.
*Dogroups make better decisions than individuals? The experimental
answer seems to be yes. And the margin of superiority of group over individual
decisions is astonishingly similar in the two experiments--about 3 1/2%.
If groups make better decisions and require no more information to do so,
then two heads--or, in this case, five--are indeed better than one. Society is, in
that case, wise to assign many important decisions to committees.
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